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As individuals, organisations and indeed the world at large have become more
dependent on computer-based systems, so there has been an ever-growing amount of
research into means for improving the dependability of these systems. In particular
there has been much work on trying to gain increased understanding of the many and
varied types of faults that need to be prevented or tolerated in order to reduce the
probability and severity of system failures. In this talk I discuss the assumptions that
are often made by computing system designers regarding faults, survey a number of
continuing issues related to fault tolerance, and identify some of the latest challenges
facing researchers in this arena.
In The Beginning
It is a great honour and privilege to be asked to give this, the second, Turing Lecture. Let me start
by mentioning that, to my great regret, I never met Alan Turing, whose tragic death occurred just a
few years before I became involved with computing. His character and achievements have however
always fascinated me - at one time I spent much effort trying to investigate his wartime work on
cryptanalysis and code-breaking devices. As a result I managed to uncover and help to gain belated
public recognition for the team that designed and built Bletchley Park’s Colossus computers.
Incidentally, this group of engineers, though ambivalent concerning Turing’s merits as a designer of
practical electronic devices, were unstinting in their admiration for his intellect, and his immense
contributions to the overall work of Bletchley Park.
After the war, Turing re-appeared on the public scene, so to speak, and was instrumental in
initiating the work at the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) on electronic computers. This
provides me another point of contact with him, since - aside from a brief flirtation with the IBM
650, a boringly easy computer to program - my initial years as a programmer were spent trying to
cope with the English Electric DEUCE computer. This computer was a direct descendant of the
machine that Turing designed at NPL in the early years after the war. Thanks to Turing’s design,
DEUCE was typically much faster in operation than its rivals, albeit almost entirely at the expense
of its programmers. Such was the innocence of youth that I and my colleagues actually enjoyed its
intricacies, and the problem of finding ways of automating, at least partially, the programming task.
Indeed, we felt that contemporary American computer developments, by IBM and others, such as
the provision of what seemed to us to be huge memories, and of floating point arithmetic hardware,
were in effect cheating. Certainly they were depriving compiler writers such as ourselves of
interesting and (we thought) worthwhile challenges.
2In my time at English Electric I and my colleagues learned the hard way the importance of writing
robust programs, though I cannot recall whether the actual term “robust” was used. However,
whatever term we used, we meant programs that could cope well with whatever strange data they
were given, whatever mistakes were made by the operators, etc. We took an active interest in robust
programming out of self-defence because we worked in close proximity to the people who were
mistreating the compilers that we were developing. In fact we had a very effective, albeit ad
hominem, “formal” definition of compiler robustness - the ability to cope with programs written by
William White, and key-punched by Barbara Black, running on a computer being operated by
Gerald Green - except that in what I’ve just said the names have been changed to protect the guilty.
This was, one might say, my first exposure to the need to “face up to faults”, albeit at this stage just
those of other people.
However, we like everyone else at the time, equated what we now term “software dependability”
with “program correctness”. To us this latter was achieved, or at least approximated to, by careful
debugging. We did not know of Turing’s extremely early work on a formal approach to program
correctness [23], or the even earlier work by von Neumann and Goldstine [8] on which it was
presumably in part at least based. (Incidentally, Cliff Jones some time ago co-authored an excellent
historical analysis of this work [17].)
Similarly, it was only later that I found that concerns about hardware and software robustness and
reliability can be traced back over a hundred years earlier. This is to a quite startling paper by
another great hero of mine, Charles Babbage, entitled “On the Mathematical Powers of the
Calculating Engine” - a paper that I had the privilege of publishing in full for the first time in a
collection of papers on “The Origins of Digital Computers” [21].
Babbage’s work on automatic calculating machines was motivated by the need for more accurate
sets of printed mathematical and navigational tables. He was extremely inventive in finding means
of designing machinery that would work reliably, and of reducing the likelihood of mistakes by
machine operators. Moreover, in the case of his design for an Analytical Engine, a programmed
mechanical computer that was to be controlled by punched cards, he also carefully considered what
we would now call software faults. In 1837 he wrote: “It must, however, be observed that if care is
demanded from the attendants for the insertion of the numbers which are changed at every new
calculation of a formula, any neglect would be absolutely unpardonable in combining the proper
cards in proper order, for the much more important purpose of constructing the formula itself, the
arrangement of whose cards is never changed at any after time. This verification might therefore be
reasonably left to the diligence of the superintendent.” Moreover, Babbage then went on to say:
“When the formula is very complicated, it may be algebraically arranged for computation in two or
more distinct ways, and two or more sets of cards may be made. If the same constants are now
employed with each set, and if under these circumstances the results agree, we may then be quite
secure of the accuracy of them all.” (This, of course, is what is now called “N-version”
programming [5].)
Babbage thus had a clear understanding of the critical role that redundancy and diversity played in
achieving dependable computing, and of the variety of faults that had to be faced up to. This was
perhaps due in part to his intense interest in how industry and business really functioned, and
presumably, therefore, also some familiarity with the use of such techniques as double entry
3bookkeeping and dual keys as a means of coping with the consequences of both accidental and
deliberate human faults.
On Fault-Tolerant Computing
The direct origins of modern fault-tolerant computing lie in John von Neumann’s influential work
in the early 1950s on “Probabilistic Logic and the Synthesis of Reliable Organisms from Unreliable
Components” [24]. In the years that followed much work was done on hardware fault tolerance,
from the (widespread) use of error detecting and correcting codes, to the more exotic realms of
replicated processors, automatic reconfiguration, etc., used in highly demanding environments, e.g.
in aerospace. However, in the software world, the notion of dependability was still equated to that
of correctness - indeed, of perfecting the software development process.
In 1968 I participated in the first NATO Software Engineering Conference at Garmisch in Bavaria
[18]. The participants came from a broad and international cross-section of industry, government
and academia. What was special and novel about this conference was the readiness of these
participants to face up to the at times very serious faults in the whole process by means of which
software was then specified, designed, implemented and deployed. The impact of this conference,
particularly on many of the attendees, was therefore immense. For example, both Edsger Dijkstra
and I have since gone on record as to how the discussions at this conference on the “software crisis”
strongly influenced our thinking and our subsequent research activities. In Dijkstra’s case the
discussions prompted his study of formal approaches to producing high quality programs. In my
case, following my move to Newcastle soon after the Garmisch Conference, they led me to consider
the then novel, and still somewhat controversial, idea of software fault tolerance. As I’ve remarked
before, Dijkstra’s and my respective choices of research problems suitably reflect our relative skills
as programmers.
It was in about 1970 that I and my colleagues in Newcastle started to think about how to face up to
what we assumed was the probability, nay virtual certainty, that any large software system would
contain residual faults. In considering the possibility of complementing all the work on software
fault prevention and removal by finding automated means of tolerating the faults that nevertheless
persisted, we felt we were very much going out on a limb. Certainly our aims were deeply
unfashionable in academic circles at least. But the detailed study we made of a number of large on-
line computer systems confirmed that software faults were a major cause of undependability in such
systems, and more importantly, led us to realise that:
(i) a significant fraction of the code in such systems was aimed at detecting and recovering
from errors caused by hardware and operational faults,
(ii) this code was ad hoc and limited in its capability, e.g. concerning the possibility of
concurrent faults, or of further errors being detected while error recovery was already being
attempted, yet
(iii) nevertheless, essentially by accident, these error recovery facilities did in fact help to
provide a useful measure of software fault tolerance.
4This study marked the start of a still-continuing, and indeed now greatly-expanded, programme of
research at Newcastle on system dependability, and in particular fault tolerance, which has been
funded by a succession of research grants from UK and European government sources, and from
industry.
System dependability is in fact a research field that has over the years retained two particular
characteristics that are very pleasing, at least to the researchers involved. First, all aspects of how a
system is designed, implemented and deployed can have an effect on its dependability. Second,
human nature being what it is, it seems that the more dependable computing systems become, the
more dependence is placed on them. Thus there is an ever-continuing need for a broad research
programme in the area.
The extent of this need is perhaps best illustrated by the following sample statistics regarding the
costs of undependability:
• the average cost per hour of downtime (lost revenue in banking, manufacturing, retail,
health insurances, securities, reservations, etc.) is $78,000. [1]
• the French Insurer’s Association has estimated that the yearly cost of computer failures is 10
- 12B Francs, of which slightly more than half is due to deliberately induced faults (e.g. by
hackers and corrupt insiders). [14]
• a survey by the Standish Group has indicated that the yearly cost of abandoned software
projects in the USA exceeds $80B. [10]
In the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that dependability features large in the European
Union’s new Information Society Technologies (IST) programme within the Fifth Framework.
Right from the start, in IST planning documents one typically found prominent statements to the
effect that dependability is one of the key issues that “will be addressed ubiquitously throughout the
programme”. Indeed now it is the subject of a continuing “Cross-Programme Action”, within which
a portfolio of major dependability R&D projects is being built up, including ones in which I and my
colleagues will be participating.
On Concepts
Let me now move from generalities about dependability to the particular topic of fault tolerance -
starting with a discussion of just what is meant by the term “fault”. The concept of a “fault” is
surprisingly subtle - or, as I would prefer to put it, “gloriously recursive”. Indeed, clarifying the
concepts related to dependability is difficult when one is talking about systems in which there are
uncertainties about system boundaries, the very complexity of the system (and its specification, if it
has one) is a major problem, judgements as to possible causes or consequences of failure can be
very subtle, and there are (fallible) provisions for preventing faults from causing failures. This is
one of the main points that I want to make in this lecture.
Early on in our work at Newcastle on software fault tolerance we had realised the inadequacy, with
regard to residual design faults, of the definitions of terms such as fault and error used at that time
by hardware designers. I well remember my then-colleague, Mike Melliar-Smith, visiting our
5Department of Philosophy in search of help, and coming back saying: “they seem to know a lot
about truth, but very little about error”. The problem with the hardware definitions was that they
took as their basis a set of definitions of a few particular forms of well-known fault, such as “stuck-
at-zero” faults, “bridging” faults, etc. This approach did not seem at all appropriate for thinking
about residual design faults, given the huge variety, and the lack of any useful classification, of such
faults. In fact, we eventually realised that we could achieve the generality we needed by starting not
from faults, but from the concept of a system “failure” [20].
The ensuing generality of our definitions led us to start using the term “reliability” in a much
broader sense than was then common, since a system might fail in all sorts of ways. It was a French
colleague, Jean-Claude Laprie of LAAS-CNRS, who came to our linguistic rescue by proposing the
use of the term “dependability” [12] for the concept underlying our broadened definition of
reliability. The term dependability thus includes as special cases such properties as availability,
reliability, safety, confidentiality, integrity, etc. These are illustrated in Figure 1, taken from [13], as
being attributes of dependability.
DEPENDABILITY
ATTRIBUTES
AVAILABILITY 
RELIABILITY
SAFETY
CONFIDENTIALITY
INTEGRITY
MAINTAINABILITY
FAULT PREVENTION
FAULT TOLERANCE
FAULT REMOVAL
FAULT FORECASTING
MEANS
THREATS
FAULTS
ERRORS
FAILURES
Figure 1 : The dependability tree
Quoting from the latest published version of the dependability definitions [13]:1
“A system failure occurs when the delivered service deviates from fulfilling the
system function , the latter being what the system is aimed at..”
The phrase “what the system is aimed at” is a means of avoiding reference to a system
“specification” - since it is not unusual for a system’s lack of dependability to be due to
inadequacies in its documented specification.
Systems of interest will possess an internal state:
1
 A revised edition of [12]] and hence of the definitions in [13], is currently being prepared by Jean-
Claude Laprie, Al Avizienis and myself.
6“An error is that part of the system state which is liable to lead to subsequent
failure: an error affecting the service is an indication that a failure occurs or has
occurred. The adjudged or hypothesised cause of an error is a fault .”
Note that an error may be judged to have multiple causes, and does not necessarily lead to a failure
- for example error recovery might be attempted successfully and failure averted.
“A failure occurs when an error ‘passes through’ the system-user interface and
affects the service delivered by the system - a system of course being composed of
components which are themselves systems. Thus the manifestation of failures, faults
and errors follows a “fundamental chain”:
. . . fi  failure fi  fault fi error fi  failure fi  fault fi  . . .”
One example of this fundamental chain is as follows:
“the result of a programmer’s error is a (dormant) fault in the written software
(faulty instruction(s) or data); upon activation (invoking the component where the
fault resides and triggering the faulty instruction, instruction sequence or data by an
appropriate input pattern) the fault becomes active and produces an error; if and
when the erroneous data affect the delivered service (in value and/or in timing of
their delivery), a failure occurs.” [11]
The recognition of the importance of this chain - which takes the form of
. . . fi  event fi  cause fi state fi  event fi  cause fi  . . .
led to a great increase in our ability to understand, and to design means of ameliorating, all sorts of
complex manifestations of undependability. Let me give you one further example:
A fighter plane crashed killing the pilot - it turned out that it had for a period before
this failure (i.e. the crash) been calculating its position erroneously, and that this was
due to it having been fitted with the wrong (albeit correctly functioning) inertial
navigation subsystem. One could describe this as the fault. In fact, this fault had
arisen as the result of a failure of the (largely human) system responsible for
maintaining the plane. But this failure (i.e. the act of installing the wrong inertial
navigation subsystem) could in part be blamed on a much earlier failure of the
system that had specified and designed the whole plane maintenance system; it had
created a situation in which two functionally distinct inertial navigation subsystems
had identical mechanical interfaces, and catalogue numbers that differed by only one
in the least significant digit! This was surely a situation that was a positive invitation
to disaster. In fact it was eventually determined that the erroneous catalogue number
had been generated as a result of a hitherto un-noticed failure by the computerised
inventory control system. This failure was due to the fact that an overflow had
occurred from a quantity field into the catalogue number field, in a COBOL program
that contained no checks against overflow. So, here we have a whole set of different
7systems, and a complicated chain, in which failures in one system constituted faults
in other systems that created erroneous states which were not corrected but instead
led to further failures.
This by the way is a true incident. The good news is that the overall inventory control process was
in other respects so well designed and managed that it was possible to determine when the overflow
had occurred and which other planes also had been fitted with the wrong inertial navigation
subsystem - so other impending fatalities were averted. In fact, some of the most important sources
of the whole subject of database transactions and integrity controls derive in large part from this
work, which was carried out by C.T. Davies, first for the U.S. Air Force, and later at IBM, and led
to the creation of the very influential “spheres of control” concept [6].
The notion I am using here of failure is very general - so failures can usefully be classified in a
number of ways - the most important of which are summarised in Figure 2 (also taken from [13]):
FAILURES
DOMAIN
PERCEPTION
BY SEVERAL USERS
CONSEQUENCES
ON ENVIRONMENT
VALUE FAILURES
TIMING FAILURES
CONSISTENT FAILURES
UNCONSISTENT  (“BYZANTINE”) FAILURES
BENIGN FAILURES
             •
             •
             •
CATASTROPHIC FAILURES
Figure 2 : Failure classification
The wording that has been in use for some time as a definition of computer system dependability
per se is:
“Dependability is defined as that property of a computer system such that
reliance can justifiably be placed on the service it delivers. (The service delivered by
a system is its behaviour as it is perceptible by its user(s); a user is another system
(human or physical) which interacts with the former.)”
I now feel it possible, and worthwhile, to improve on the definition of “failure” in order to make
explicit the judgement that is involved, and to use this more directly in the definition of
dependability.
8A given system, operating in some particular environment (a wider system), may fail
in the sense that some other system makes, or could in principle have made, a
judgement that the activity or inactivity of the given system constitutes failure .
The second system, the judgmental system, may be an automated system, a human being, the
relevant judicial authority or whatever. (It may or may not have a documented system specification
to guide it.) Different judgmental systems might, of course, come to different decisions regarding
the given system. Moreover, such a judgmental system might itself fail - in the eyes of some other
judgmental system - a possibility that is well understood by the legal system, with its hierarchy of
courts. So, we can have a (recursive) notion of “failure” which is defined merely in terms of what
are taken as the fundamental, dictionary-defined, concepts of “system” and “judgement”, and which
clearly is a relative rather than an absolute notion. So then is the concept of dependability:
The concept of dependabil ity can be simply defined as “the quality or
characteristic of being dependable”, where the adjective “dependable” is attributed to
a system whose failures are judged sufficiently rare or insignificant.
It should be noted that these definitions, and the four basic means of obtaining and establishing high
dependability, namely fault prevention, fault tolerance, fault removal and fault forecasting, are as
applicable to human and industrial systems, as they are to computer systems. In particular they are
applicable to the part-manual part-automated systems that are used to design and implement
computer systems. This generality, and the explicit role given to judgement, are important given the
subtleties that are sometimes involved in identifying the exact boundaries of the various systems of
concern, of resolving disagreements regarding the acceptability of a system’s specified and/or
actual behaviour, and of determining how blame should be apportioned after a system fails.
This continued interest that I and a number of people involved in dependability research take in
concepts and definitions perhaps seems rather pedantic, though I believe it is fully justified. One
reason of course is the subtleties involved, and the need to clarify them. Another is the fact that a
number of what are essentially dependability concepts are being re-invented (sometimes rather
incompetently), or at least re-named, in numerous research communities, which variously
categorise their area of interest as safety, survivability, trustworthiness, security, critical
infrastructure protection, information survivability, or whatever.
The issue of whether the different research communities use a common set of terms is much less
important than their failure to recognise that they are concerning themselves with (different facets
of) the same concept. One consequence is that they are not getting as much advantage from each
others’ insights and advances as they might. However, regardless of the terminology employed, I
believe it is very important to have, and to use, some term for the general concept, i.e. that which is
associated with a fully general notion of failure as opposed to one which is restricted in some way
to particular types, causes or consequences of failure. (I also believe it is essential to have separate
terms for the three essentially different concepts named here “fault”, “error” and “failure” - since
otherwise one cannot deal properly with the complexities (and realities) of failure-prone
components, being assembled together in possibly incorrect ways, so resulting in failure-prone
systems.) Only when this is done will, I believe, the researchers take an adequately general
approach to the problems that they are attempting to tackle. And if I manage to put over only one
point in this lecture - this is the one I hope it will be.
9In fact, time and time again it seems to me that muddled thinking about dependability-related
notions has been a barrier to progress - most recently I have been alerted to this in the work of the
“intrusion detection” research community. This community concerns itself with a major aspect of
the problem of protecting computer networks and networked computers from hackers. As some of
the researchers involved have admitted, the community has got itself into very confused and
confusing debates as it tries to expand its horizons beyond the problem of merely detecting the fact
that some hacker is, or has recently been, intruding into a system. I will return to this topic later.
On Fault Classification
As I have indicated, the faults that might affect a computer-based system are many and varied. A
detailed classification is provided by Laprie [13], the first part of which is summarised in Figure 3.
PHYSICAL FAULTS
HUMAN-MADE FAULTS
ACCIDENTAL FAULTS
INTENTIONAL NON-MALICIOUS FAULTS
INTENTIONAL MALICIOUS FAULTS
DEVELOPMENT FAULTS
OPERATIONAL FAULTS
INTERNAL FAULTS
EXTERNAL FAULTS
PERMANENT FAULTS
TEMPORARY FAULTS
FAULTS
PHENOMENOLOGICAL
CAUSE
NATURE
PHASE OF CREATION
OR OCCURRENCE
SYSTEM BOUNDARIES
PERSISTENCE
Figure 3 : Fault classification
The actual application of this classification itself involves judgement. For example, is a hardware
component that occasionally fails as a result of electronic interference suffering temporary
operational physical faults, or should one regard it as having been provided with inadequate
shielding, i.e. regard the situation as being due to a permanent human-made development fault?
Nevertheless, such classifications can provide useful guidance, in particular with regard to planning
means of fault prevention, tolerance, diagnosis, and removal, based on the designer’s assumptions
about likely faults. Actual automated fault tolerance strategies can however make only limited use
of such classifications, depending on the extent to which faults can be quickly and accurately
recognised as belonging to a class for which some specialised fault tolerance measure is particularly
appropriate. This is often not feasible - for example, it is often difficult to be sure whether the
immediate cause of an error is an operational hardware fault or a residual software design fault, so
if both possibilities are to be allowed for a very general fault tolerance strategy must be employed.
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Logical, or qualitative, classification is however just a starting point. All work on system
dependability is, or at any rate should be, guided by considerations of relative probabilities. There is
little point, for example, in providing a parity bit with each byte being transmitted over a network if
the most common form of fault causes long bursts of errors. Similarly, there is little point
employing expensive and time-consuming code verification tools if in a particular application
domain virtually all the significant failures arise from inadequate system specifications. The success
with which one can design a system that will achieve some required level fault of tolerance
therefore depends on the quality of the statistics that are available, or of the statistical assumptions
made by the designers, concerning the faults that will occur.
In principle, and often in practice, one can have relatively accurate statistics concerning operational
hardware faults, detailed enough to provide very useful guidance as to what specific fault tolerance
measures are needed where, and what ones are not worth their cost. When it comes to residual
design faults, such statistics as are available are too imprecise to be of much use, so fault tolerance
provisions have to be very general. Thus one of the motivations behind the original recovery block
scheme was to provide means of error recovery that would work (almost) no matter what fault
existed where in the suspect program.
ensure acceptance test
by primary alternate
else by alternate 2
.
.
else by alternate n
else error
Figure 4 : The Recovery Block Structure
With the program structuring scheme that we developed this was the case so long as the underlying
recovery and control mechanism was not corrupted. However, the degree to which the error
recovery mechanism could be used to provide successful fault tolerance, i.e., enable the program to
continue and produce satisfactory results, of course depended on the adequacy of the programmer-
supplied error detection measures (such as acceptance tests) and last-ditch alternate blocks. Our first
demonstration recovery block system involved a fault tolerant application program containing a
complete acceptance test and final alternate block, running on a simulated machine which
completely confined programs within their allotted resources. We then provided visitors with means
of making arbitrary changes to the code of any or all of the alternate blocks (other than the final
one) in the running application program - the challenge to them being to find some means of
preventing the program from producing correct results. Within a short period of time this
demonstration system had been honed to the point where no visitors were able to subvert it. This
demonstration was a very compelling one. (It certainly helped us get further research funding!)
The demonstration in fact indicated that when the concern is with the possibility of malicious faults
the only sensible thing is to assume that the situation is statistically as bad as could be imagined -
that faults occur at locations, in circumstances, and with a frequency, that are essentially “pessimal”
from a designers viewpoint. (The term “pessimal” is in fact not in the dictionary, though its
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meaning, and the need for such a word, are both self-evident, particularly now that computers have
been invented.) I will return to the problems of tolerating malicious faults later.
On Fault Assumptions
The problems of preventing faults in systems from leading to system failures vary greatly in
difficulty depending on the (it is hoped justified) assumptions that the designers make about the
nature as well as the frequency of the faults, and the effectiveness of the fault tolerance mechanisms
that are employed. For example, one might choose to assume that operational hardware faults can
be cost-effectively masked (i.e hidden) by the use of hardware replication and voting, and that any
residual software design faults can be adequately masked by the use of design diversity, i.e. using
N-version programming. In such circumstances error recovery is not needed. In many realistic
situations, however, if the likelihood of a failure is to be kept within acceptable bounds, error
recovery facilities will have to be provided, in addition to whatever fault prevention and fault
masking techniques are used.
In a decentralised system, i.e. one whose activity can be usefully modelled by a set of partly
independent threads of control, the problems of error recovery will vary greatly depending on what
design assumptions can be justified. For example, if the designer concerns him/herself simply with
a distributed database system and disallows (i.e. ignores) the possibility of undetected invalid inputs
or outputs, the errors that have to be recovered from will essentially all be ones that are wholly
within the computer system. In this situation backward error recovery (i.e. recovery to an earlier, it
is hoped error-free, state) will suffice, and be readily implementable, such is the nature of computer
storage. If such a system is serving the needs of a set of essentially independent users, competing
against each other to access and perhaps update the database, then the now extensive literature on
database transaction processing and protocols can provide a fertile source of well-engineered, and
mathematically well-founded, solutions to such problems [9].
However, the multiple activities in a decentralised system will often not simply be competing
against each other for access to some shared internal resource, but rather will on occasion at least be
attempting to co-operate with each other, in small or large groups, in pursuit of some common goal.
This will make the provision of backward error recovery more complicated than is the case in basic
transaction-oriented systems. And the problem of avoiding the “domino effect” [20], in which a
single fault can lead to a whole sequence of rollbacks, will be much harder if one cannot disallow
(i.e. ignore) the possibility of undetected invalid communications between activities.
When a system of interacting threads employs backward recovery, each thread will be continually
establishing and discarding checkpoints, and may also on occasion need to restore its state to one
given in a previously established checkpoint. But if interactions are not controlled, and
appropriately co-ordinated with checkpoint management, then the rollback of one thread can result
in a cascade of rollbacks that could push all the threads back to their beginnings.
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inter-thread communication checkpoint
T1
T2
Figure 5 : The domino effect
However, the domino effect would not occur if it could safely be assumed that data was fully
validated before it was output, i.e. was transmitted from one thread to another. (Similarly, the effect
would be avoided if a thread could validate its inputs fully.) Such an assumption is in effect made in
simple transaction-based systems, in which outputs are allowed to occur only after a transaction has
been “committed”. Moreover, in such systems the notion of commitment is regarded as absolute, so
that once the commitment has been made, there is no going back, i.e. there is no provision for the
possibility that an output was invalid. The notion of nested transactions can be used to limit the
amount of activity that has to be abandoned when backward recovery (of small inner transactions)
is invoked. However, this notion typically still assumes that there are absolute “outermost”
transactions, and that outputs to the world outside the database system, e.g. to the users, that take
place after such outermost transactions end must be presumed to be valid.
The conversation scheme[3] provides a means of co-ordinating the recovery provisions of
interacting threads so as to avoid the domino effect, without making assumptions regarding output
or input validation. Figure 6 shows an example where three threads communicate within a
conversation and the threads T1 and T2 communicate within a nested conversation. Communication
can only take place between threads that are participating in a conversation together, so while T1
and T2 are in their inner conversation they cannot damage or be damaged by T3.
The operation of a conversation is as follows: (i) on entry to a conversation a thread establishes a
checkpoint; (ii) if an error is detected by any thread then all the participating threads must restore
their checkpoints; (iii) after restoration all threads then attempt to make further progress; and (iv) all
threads leave the conversation together, only if all pass any acceptance tests that are provided. (If
this is not possible, the conversation fails - a situation which causes the enclosing conversation to
invoke backward error recovery at its level. )
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inter-thread communication checkpoint
T1
T2
T3
conversation boundary acceptance test
Figure 6 : Nested conversations
Both transactions and conversations are examples of atomic actions [16], in that viewed from the
outside, they appear to perform their activity as a single indivisible action. (In practice transaction-
support systems also implement other properties, such as “durability”, i.e. a guarantee that the
results produced by completed transactions will not be lost as a result of a computer hardware
fault.) And both rely on backward error recovery.
However, systems are usually not made up just of computers - rather they will also involve other
entities (e.g. devices and humans) which in many cases will not be able to simply forget some of
their recent activity, and so simply go straight back to an exact earlier state when told that an error
has been detected. Thus forward error recovery (the typical programming mechanism for which is
exception handling), rather than backward recovery will have to be used. Each of these
complications individually makes the task of error recovery more difficult, and together they make
it much more challenging. This in fact is the topic that I and colleagues have concentrated on these
last few years.
Our Co-ordinated Atomic (CA) Action scheme [25] was arrived at as a result of work on extending
the conversation concept so as to allow for the use of forward error recovery, and to allow for both
co-operative and competitive concurrency. CA actions can be regarded as providing a discipline,
both for programming computers and for controlling their use within an organisation. This
discipline is based on nested multi-threaded transactions [4] together with very general exception
handling provisions. Within the computer(s), CA actions augment any fault tolerance that is
provided by the underlying transaction system by providing means for dealing with (i) unmasked
hardware and software faults that have been reported to the application level to deal with, and/or (ii)
application-level failure situations that have to be responded to.
Summarising, the concurrent execution threads participating in a given CA action enter and leave
the action synchronously. (This synchronisation might be either actual or logical.) Within the CA
action, operations on objects can be performed co-operatively by roles executing in parallel. If an
error is detected inside a CA action, appropriate forward and/or backward recovery measures must
be invoked co-operatively, by all the roles, in order to reach some mutually consistent conclusion.
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To support backward error recovery, a CA action must provide a recovery line that co-ordinates the
recovery points of the objects and threads participating in the action so as to avoid the domino
effect. To support forward error recovery, a CA action must provide an effective means of co-
ordinating the use of exception handlers. An acceptance test can and ideally should be provided in
order to determine whether the outcome of the CA action is successful. Error recovery for
participating threads of a CA action generally requires the use of explicit error co-ordination
mechanisms, i.e. exception handling or backward error recovery within the CA action; objects that
are external to the CA action and so can be shared with other actions and threads must provide their
own error co-ordination mechanisms and behave atomically with respect to other CA actions and
threads.
Figure 7 shows an example in which two concurrent threads enter a CA action in order to play the
corresponding roles. Within the CA action the two concurrent roles communicate with each other
and manipulate the external objects co-operatively in pursuit of some common goal - portrayed in
the Figure by the arrow from Role 1 to Role 2. However, during the execution of the CA action, an
exception e is raised by Role 2. Role 1 is then informed of the exception and both roles transfer
control to their respective exception handlers H1 and H2 for this particular exception, which then
attempt to perform forward error recovery. (When multiple exceptions are raised within an action, a
resolution algorithm based on an exception resolution graph [3; 28] is used to identify the
appropriate “covering” exception, and hence the set of exception handlers to be used in this
situation.) The effects of erroneous operations on external objects are repaired, if possible, by
putting the objects into new correct states so that the CA action is able to exit with an acceptable
outcome. The two threads leave the CA action synchronously at the end of the action.
Thread  1
Thread 2
Time
CA action
e
raised exception e
exception handler H1
abnormal control flow
suspended control flow
Role 2
Role1 return to normal
exit with success
entry points exit points
accesses repairs
exception handler H2
abnormal control flow
suspended control flow return to normal
External 
Objects
start transaction commit transaction
Figure 7 : Example of a CA Action
In general, the desired effect of performing a CA action is specified by an acceptance test. The
effect only becomes visible if the test is passed. The acceptance test allows both a normal outcome
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and one or more exceptional (or degraded) outcomes, with each exceptional outcome signalling a
specified exception to the surrounding environment (typically a larger CA action).
We have in recent years, with colleagues in the EU-funded long-term research project DeVa
(Design for Validation), investigated the advantages and limitations of this approach to structuring
systems so as to facilitate the design and validation of sophisticated error recovery, through a series
of detailed case studies. Publications describing these include [22; 26; 27; 29].
However, my purpose in describing this particular line of development in fault tolerance was not so
much to argue the merits of CA actions, but rather to illustrate the crucial role that a designer’s
choice of fault assumptions should make in directing the subsequent design activity. (For example,
the vast majority of research, and practice, in the distributed systems world assumes that a computer
fails by crashing - i.e. is a “fail-silent” device, despite the existence of evidence that this is by no
means always the case.) The crucial nature of this choice applies not only when one is considering
the fault assumptions underlying the design of a fault-tolerant computer, but also the merits of a
particular system design, implementation and validation process. (Which if any aspects of this
process can justifiably be assumed to be faultless - the specification, the compiler, the formal
validation?) Yet all too often, inadequate attention is paid to identifying and justifying a set of fault
assumptions - this indeed is one of the major messages I want to put across in this talk.
On Structure
Another of the messages that I want to convey is the particular importance of the role that system
structuring plays in achieving dependability, especially where such dependability has to be achieved
in the face of complex system requirements, and the complex realities of a fault-ridden world. I
have had a keen personal interest for many years in the topic of system structuring, initially
motivated by work at IBM on methodologies and tools for aiding the design of a large
multiprocessing system [30], and then at Newcastle on dependability. The earliest work at
Newcastle, on recovery blocks, was in fact all about structuring. Recovery blocks offer a means of
introducing lots of extra redundant code into an application (acceptance tests and alternate blocks)
without greatly adding to the overall system complexity. Unless this were the case, the scheme
would of course be self-defeating.
The recovery block structure, with its underlying recovery cache for automating the provision of
checkpoints, avoids causing a complexity explosion by allowing the programming of the different
alternate blocks to be performed independently, both of each other, and of the problems of
recovering from each other’s errors. Thus, as always, structuring is being used as a means of
dividing and conquering complexity. However, it is worth distinguishing between different sorts of
complexity, and its counterpart, simplicity.
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Tony Hoare once said: “The price of reliability is utter simplicity - and this is a price that major
software manufacturers find too high to afford!” This is true, but so is Einstein’s remark that:
“Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler”.2
As I’ve discussed above, one can gain much simplicity by making assumptions as to the nature of
the faults that will not occur (whether in system specification, design or operation). But this will be
a spurious simplicity if the assumptions are false. Good system structuring allows one to deal with
the added complexity that result from more realistic fault assumptions.
What is meant here by good structuring is not just the conventional characteristics, such as coupling
and cohesion, that are used to determine the impact of structuring on performance, but also a
characteristic which might be termed “strength”. A strongly-structured system is one in which the
structuring exists in the actual system, (as opposed to being used just in descriptions of, or the
design for, a system) and helps to limit the impact of any faults - the analogy being to water-tight
bulkheads in a ship.
For example, one of the standard (hardware) fault tolerance techniques is Triple Modular
Redundancy (TMR) - figure 8 is a typical illustration, found in many textbooks, of part of an
overall TMR system, involving a triplicated component and voter.
V
V
V
Figure 8 : Triple Modular Redundancy
One of the principal assumptions underlying TMR is that its structuring is strong. A majority vote
that is obtained by collusion, whether accidental or deliberate, between two of the triplicated
components or voters, is worthless. Thus it is essential that there to be good reason to assume that
there is and can be no communication between these components or between these votes - that they
are properly insulated from each other, that no-one has accidentally left a screw-driver across them,
and - more subtly - that they are indeed wired together in the form shown in the Figure.
2
 As quoted in Reader's Digest (British edition), Vol 111, No 666, October 1977, p. 164. The
German original is normally given as “Alles sollte so einfach wie möglich gemacht werden, aber
nicht einfacher”.
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Taking a software example, it would be possible to use mere programming conventions to
implement a recovery block-like approach. But the scheme is only truly effective if there are some
effective means of enforcing the required separation between alternates, for example, so that one
can have adequate reason to assume that a residual design fault in one alternate cannot impact any
of the other alternates.
On Diversity
Rather than continue to develop this theme of the importance of system structuring, let me move on
the topics of redundancy and diversity - which are much more specific to fault tolerance.
All fault tolerance involves the use of redundancy - of representation and/or activity - whose
consistency can be checked. I have concentrated on what one might term “built-in” fault tolerance -
but the system design process can also benefit from redundancy and consistency checking. For
example, a system specification is likely to be improved (to the benefit of the dependability of the
resulting system) if the specification is scrutinised by knowledgeable system designers who have
the task of creating a system to match the specification. This opportunity is of course lost if this
process is automated. And indeed, a recent experiment by Ross Anderson has convincingly shown
the advantages of massive (human) redundancy, in developing security specifications [2].
Redundancy takes several different forms. Repeated operation of a single device, or the parallel
operation of multiple copies of such a device, can provide means of tolerating some kinds of fault,
but not in general design faults. What is needed for this is design (including specification) diversity.
Unfortunately, despite its importance, the concept of design diversity is not at all well understood.
Like complexity, it is hard to define, leave alone to measure effectively.
The effectiveness of redundancy depends on the extent to which the diversely-designed
representations or activities are dependent upon each other with respect to types of fault that are to
be tolerated. If they are completely independent - something that is often assumed despite being
rarely if ever true - then the probability of coincident faults can be very low indeed. Extremely high
dependability could be achieved in such circumstances, for example via the use of majority voting,
assuming that the initial non-redundant versions are already reasonably dependable.
Such independence arguments were used as the basis of highly over-optimistic early estimates of
the efficacy of N-version programming. In fact it turns out that there is a strong theoretical basis for
the non-independence of faults in “independently-designed” software. As explained for example in
[15], the demands placed upon systems by their environment can vary in ‘difficulty’, and this
variation induces dependence upon the failure processes of different ‘diverse’ versions.
Nevertheless, redundancy, including software design diversity, can provide considerable added
dependability - though it is problematic to predict just how much, given the difficulty of assessing
the degree of dependence, indeed the degree of diversity.
Just as deliberate use of diverse designs, or of diversity in the design process, can have significant
benefits, accidental lack of diversity can have considerable dangers. This is well known in the world
of biology, for example - but the phenomenon is also highly relevant in a computer world in which
particular (ad hoc) standard platforms and protocols are becoming increasingly dominant. One
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might have thought that uniformity would lead to a reduction in complexity that would be very
beneficial with respect to dependability - unfortunately life is not so simple. A nine hour outage, on
15 January 1990, of the long-distance phone system in the USA [19] was largely due to the fact that
all the switches were of a single common design; and the impact of computer viruses is much
greater now that so many people are using basically the same hardware and software.
So much for diversity. The topics that I have discussed so far, namely (i) fault concepts,
classification and assumptions, (ii) system structuring, and (iii) redundancy and diversity, are to my
mind the perennial central topics underlying the problem of achieving dependability from complex
systems. I hope that I have succeeded in bringing out the fact these are a set of, so-to-speak,
everlasting dependability research topics - ones that have been studied for years and yet still need
much more study. However, let me now, against this background, devote the final part of my talk to
a brief summary of one particular research issue in dependability that is I believe particularly
topical.
Malicious Faults
I now, some thirty years after we started thinking about design fault tolerance, have a great sense of
deja vu. This is because I and my colleagues (this time not just in Newcastle, but also from several
other research groups across Europe) are again setting out, in a new EU-funded research project, to
see whether we can extend the scope of fault tolerance technology (and in our case, ideas such as
CA Actions) to cover a type of fault that hitherto has largely been regarded as one to be prevented
and/or removed, rather than coped with automatically. The type of fault I have in mind is the
intentional malicious fault, arising from the nefarious activities of hackers and - much worse -
corrupt insiders (including people who have systems administration roles).
Such protection is needed because the likely reality is that most large systems will have to be used
even though it is known that they contain vulnerabilities. Some of these vulnerabilities might even
have been identified already, but for some reason must be allowed to remain in the system; other
vulnerabilities will be awaiting discovery - probably first by system hackers. Thus means for
tolerating malicious faults will be needed, not just for reporting detected intrusions to the
management, if continuous service is needed from the system.
Over a decade ago I and a colleague, John Dobson, first started to think about this sort of problem,
though we did not develop the idea extensively at the time. The main result of our work was a paper
[7] whose title “Building reliable secure systems from unreliable insecure components” (a
deliberate allusion to von Neumann) both neatly summed up our approach, and provoked one of the
referees of the conference at which it was presented, the IEEE Oakland “Privacy and Security”
conference, to describe it as “highly controversial” - though now I think the idea, or at least the aim,
is more accepted.
Our recently-started collaborative research project has, at least for internal use, the appropriate
project acronym MAFIA, standing for “Malicious- and Accidental- Fault-tolerant Internet
Applications”. (The official acronym is MAFTIA.) The project brings together teams working on
encryption, intrusion detection, asynchronous distributed algorithms, rigorous evaluation and, of
course, fault tolerance. Its name makes clear that we feel it necessary to deal with what I might term
conventional, non-deliberate, faults as well as those that result from deliberate attempts to stop a
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system functioning, or to subvert whatever security policies it is supposed to adhere to, for example
regarding preservation of confidentiality.
One of the main project objectives is to develop a reference model that provides a conceptual and
architectural framework for ensuring the dependability of distributed applications in the face of a
wide class of faults and attacks. The reference model will need to provide a clear characterisation of
the kind of systems the project will be addressing. It will also identify assumptions concerning the
underlying infrastructure; about what is available to would-be attackers and about what issues
should be application-level rather than infrastructure concerns. The architectural framework will
identify and specify the critical system components that are needed within the infrastructure, the
relationships between these components, and the protocols that enable them and the application
programs that rely on them to continue to function properly in the face of attacks. Aided by such a
framework, the project will work on: (i) mechanisms and protocols that provide the necessary
building blocks for implementing large-scale dependable applications, and (ii) verification and
assessment of such mechanisms and protocols, using a formal specification language and automatic
verification tools (primarily model-checking). However, just as thirty years ago we had no
pretensions to providing total design fault tolerance, we now have no expectation of being able to
provide means of totally protecting systems against their attackers. Nevertheless, I am confident
that it will prove possible to provide a worthwhile amount of such protection.
Concluding Remarks
Much of this lecture has been aimed at trying to explain what I believe to be some of the most
important issues of long term and continuing importance in dependability, and - more briefly - at
describing one research topic that is particularly relevant at the moment (and which is,
unsurprisingly, ones of those that I and my colleagues plan to concentrate on in the near future -
unfortunately there is no time to discuss any of the others).
But my fundamental aims in this lecture, implied by its title, have been first to argue how important
it is to accept the reality of human fallibility and frailty, both in the design and the use of computer
systems, and second to indicate various constructive approaches to trying to cope with this
uncomfortable reality. Such an attitude to the likelihood of faults, if it were more prevalent in our
community, would I believe go some way toward improving our standing, and that of our subject,
among the general public. But in fact all too often, the latest information technology research and
development ideas and plans are described in a style which would not seem out of place in an
advertisement for hair restorer.
A recent striking example occurred at the European Union’s annual Information Society
Technologies conference, which took place in Helsinki a couple of months ago. One of the major
plenary sessions was on the notion of “The Ambient Network”, a newly-coined term that is meant
to be descriptive of a world in which there will be in effect a single system of billions of
“networked information devices” - of everything connected to everything. In the whole debate the
only major challenge (i.e. problem) standing in the way of creating The Ambient Network that was
mentioned, by any of the very eminent speakers, was “usability” - there was not a single mention of
“mis-usability” or “dependability”, leave alone of the possibility of large scale failure, e.g. of a
Europe-wide set of blue screens, caused either by accidental or malicious faults! In making these
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comments, I am not saying that the “Ambient Network” is inherently a bad idea, and that it should
not be developed. However, I do believe that considerable care should be taken in designing (and
indeed even in talking publicly about) such a system to keep possible dependability problems in
mind, and to consider the need for credible means of minimising the frequency and seriousness of
system failures.
One final remark: it is many years since I first challenged a group of Newcastle research students to
think about their choice of research topic by asking themselves the question, “Are you sure that you
will want your grand-children to know that you worked in computing?” I now have my first grand-
child, so the question is coming rather close to home. I trust that my personal choice of research
field, and hence of the subject matter for this lecture, will go at least some of the way to justifying
my daring to answer my own question in the (tentative) affirmative. But only time will tell.
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